Kant and the Ethics of Humility: A Story of Dependence, Corruption and Virtue

In recent years, philosophers have either ignored the virtue of humility or found it to be in need of radical redefinition. But humility is a central human virtue, and it is the purpose of this book to defend that claim from a Kantian point of view. Jeanine Grenberg argues that we can indeed speak of Aristotelian-style, but still deeply Kantian, virtuous character traits. She proposes moving from focus on action to focus on person, not leaving the former behind, but instead taking it up within a larger, more satisfying Kantian moral theory. Using examples from literature as well as philosophy, she shows that there is a Kantian virtue theory to be explored in which humility plays a central role. Her book will have a wide appeal to readers not only in Kant studies but also in theological ethics and moral psychology.

• Clear, readable style, with regular use of examples from literature as well as philosophy • The first clear person-centred (as opposed to act-centred) account of Kantian virtue • Relates Kantian ethics to questions of virtue ethics, self-knowledge and self-deception

Contents

Introduction; Part I. Kantian Virtue: 1. Dependent and corrupt rational agency; 2. Constraints on any possible Kantian account of virtue; 3. A Kantian account of virtue; Part II. A Kantian Response to Recent Accounts of Humility: 4. A Kantian response to recent accounts of humility; Part III: 5. The Kantian Virtue of Humility: 5. The Kantian virtue of humility; 6. Humility and self-respect; 7. The humble person; Part IV. The Virtues of Kantian Humility: 8. The humble pursuit of self-knowledge; 9. The humble pursuit of respect for persons; Conclusion.

Review

\'Kant and the Ethics of Humility is an excellent book, one that should be taken seriously by Kant scholars, virtue ethicists, and contemporary moral philosophers generally. It offers a compelling example of Kantian virtue ethics in practice, one that can be a model for similar studies in the future.\'

– Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews