Propositional Attitudes

This book makes a stimulating contribution to the philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. It begins with a spirited defence of the view that propositions are structured and that propositional structure is ‘psychologically real’. The author then develops a subtle view of propositions and attitude ascription. The view is worked out in detail with attention to such topics as the semantics of conversations, iterated attitude ascriptions, and the role of propositions as bearers of truth. Along the way important issues in the philosophy of mind are addressed. Though intended primarily for professional philosophers and graduate students the book will also interest cognitive scientists and linguists.

Acknowledgements Part I. Structure: 1. Structureless propositions 2. Structured intensions 3. The structure of propositions 4. The sorts of sententialism 5. Tacit beliefs 2. SOME COGNITIVE THEORIES OF CONTENT 1. A problem for Fregeanism 2. An obvious solution reconsidered 3. Sense and similarity 4. Conceptual role 5. Conclusion 3. ASCRIBING ATTITUDES 1. Russellianism 2. Saying what others think 3. Worries about words 4. Applications and amplifications 4. SOME ISSUES IN LOGIC AND SEMANTICS 1. Quantification and Leibniz\'s law 2. Deomonstratives and reflexivity 3. Belief retention 4. Truth and RAMs 5. Reference and content Conclusion Bibliography Index.

‘... important both for its original view and the consistently insightful and sophisticated comments on the views of others.’

– Ed Gettier, University of Massachusetts, Amherst