The Institutional Foundations of Public Policy in Argentina

This book develops a general model of public policymaking, focusing on the difficulties of securing intertemporal exchanges among politicians. By using this model the authors are able to derive a series of empirical propositions about the conditions under which policies are likely to be volatile, rigid, or high quality. In addition, the authors combine the tools of game theory with Williamson\'s transaction cost theory, North\'s institutional arguments, and contract theory, to provide a general theory of public policymaking in a comparative political economy setting. They also undertake a detailed study of Argentina, using statistical analyses on newly developed data to complement their nuanced account of institutions, rules, incentives and outcomes. Drawing on this research the book explores the reasons for Argentina\'s seeming inability to design and implement high quality public policies over a sustained period of time.

• Explains how to develop and apply transaction cost models • One of the few books by economists that takes politics seriously and actually understands political processes; it is a true work of political economy • Suitable for advanced undergraduates and graduates in comparative politics, political economy and Latin American studies

Part I. An Intertemporal Approach to Policymaking: 1. Sketch of the framework and implications; 2. A theory of intertemporal political cooperation; Part II. The Workings of Political Institutions, Policymaking, and Policies in Argentina: 3. Congress, political careers, and the provincial connection; 4. Federalism, Argentine style; 5. The Supreme Court; 6. The bureaucracy; 7. The nature of public policies in Argentina.