The World Without, the Mind Within

In this challenging study, André Gallois proposes and defends a thesis about the character of our knowledge of our own intentional states. Taking up issues at the centre of attention in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind and epistemology, he examines accounts of self-knowledge by such philosophers as Donald Davidson, Tyler Burge and Crispin Wright, and advances his own view that, without relying on observation, we are able justifiably to attribute to ourselves propositional attitudes, such as belief, that we consciously hold. His study will be of wide interest to philosophers concerned with questions about self-knowledge.

• Accomplished treatment of a very difficult topic • Distinctive and challenging arguments • Provocative engagement with the work of other scholars

Preface; Introduction; Part I. First-Person Authority: 1. The problem; 2. Scepticism about first-person authority; Part II. The Basic and Extended Accounts: 3. A preliminary account; 4. Defending the basic account; 5. Extending the basic account; 6. Objections; 7. The problem of scope; Part III. Self-Knowledge and Content Externalism: 8. Arguments from content externalism; 9. Deflationary self-knowledge: Davidson and Burge; 10. Externalism and first-person authority; 11. Psychological properties as secondary; Bibliography; Index.