Decisions and Revisions: Philosophical Essays on Knowledge and Value

This is a collection of Isaac Levi’s philosophical papers. Over the period represented by the work here, Professor Levi has developed an interrelated set of views, in the tradition of Peirce and Dewey, on epistemology and the philosophy of science and social science. This focus has been on the problem of induction and the growth of knowledge, the foundations of probability and the theory of rational decision-making. His most important essays in these areas are assembled here, with an introduction setting out their main themes and connections. As a whole the volume presents a coherent, elaborated position which will be of great interest to a range of philosophers, decision theorists, welfare and social choice theorists and cognitive scientists.

Preface; Part I. Cognitive Decision Making: 1. Must the scientist make value judgements?; 2. On the seriousness of mistakes; 3. Corroboration and rules of acceptance; 4. Deductive cogency in inductive inference; 5. Information and inference; 6. Epistemic utility and the evaluation of experiments; 7. Abduction and demands for information; Part II. Knowledge and Ignorance: 8. Truth, fallibility and the growth of knowledge; 9. Four types of ignorance; 10. Escape from boredom: edification according to Rorty; 11. Serious possibility; Part III: Chance and Surprise: 12. Subjectives, dispositions and chances; 13. Direct inference; 14. Potential surprise: its role in inference and decision making; Part IV. Decision Making: 15. Newcomb’s many problems; 16. Conflict and social agency; 17. Liberty and welfare; Bibliography of Isaac Levi; Bibliography; Index of names; Index of subjects.