Judging in Good Faith

This book offers an original theory of adjudication focused on the ethics of judging in courts of law, and proposes two main theses. One is the good faith thesis, which defends the possibility of lawful judicial decisions even when judges exercise discretion. The other is the permissible discretion thesis, which defends the compatibility of judicial discretion and legal indeterminacy with the legitimacy of adjudication in a constitutional democracy. Together these two theses oppose both conservative theories that would restrict the scope of adjudication unduly, and leftist critical theories that would liberate judges from the rule of law.

• A major new contribution to jurisprudence, providing a persuasive and coherent theory of adjudication • Of interest to philosophers of law, legal theorists, and political theorists as well as practising lawyers and judges

Part I: The Good Faith Thesis: 1. Stubborn indeterminacy; 2. The good faith thesis; 3. An illustrative case and first objections; Part II. The Permissible Discretion Thesis: 4. Science and skepticism. 5. Critical claims; 6. Philosophies of law; Part III. Law, Morals and Politics: 7. Legal and moral duties; 8. The politics of good faith; Index.