Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics

This book is a systematic and constructive treatment of a number of traditional issues at the foundation of ethics, the possibility and nature of moral knowledge, the relationship between the moral point of view and a scientific or naturalistic world view, the nature of moral value and obligation, and the role of morality in a person’s rational life plan. In striking contrast to many traditional authors and to other recent writers in the field, David Brink offers an integrated defense of the objectivity of ethics.

Preface; 1. Introduction; 2. Moral realism and moral inquiry; 3. Externalist moral realism; 4. Does moral realsim matter?; 5. A coherentist moral epistemology; 6. Moral realism and the is/ought thesis; 7. Posteriori objections to moral realism; 8. Objective utilitarianism; Appendices; Bibliography; Index.

‘I hope and expect that publication will considerably advance the subject of moral philosophy by leading to a much higher level of discussion of the main issues.’

– Gilbert Harman, Princeton University